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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and Research Question 
In the twentieth century, the international community of states has witnessed a significant 
enlargement of its members. Indeed, in less than a century, 150 new states emerged and were 
recognized as new actors of the international system. Nevertheless, despite this unprecedented 
emergence of states, the processes surrounding the recognition of statehood is not entirely 
understood by the academic community. Recognition of states is not to be confused with 
recognition of governments. Indeed, recognition of the government of a state assumes that the 
state is already recognized. And if a state refuses to recognize the government of another state, 
it does not imply that this state is not recognized as a member of the community of states1. 
Recognition by a state can be defined as the “acceptance by a state of any fact or situation 
occurring in its relations with other states”2. Nevertheless, practices of states show that rules of 
international law with regard to recognition of new states are not implemented consistently by 
recognizing states. The reason is that recognition constitutes a complex process overlapping the 
fields of international law and international relations. Therefore, recognition is still a matter of 
fierce debate within the academic community as it touches upon fundamental notions such as 
statehood, sovereignty, and the ability for a state to interact with others in the international 
arena. As Lauterpacht puts it perfectly, “there are only very few branches of international law 
which are of greater, or more persistent, interest and significance for the law of nations than the 
question of recognition of states... Yet there is probably no other subject in the field of 
international relations in which law and politics appear to be more closely interwoven”3. 
Traditionally, international law has considered two theories with regard to recognition. The 
constitutive theory postulates that recognition is a “necessary act before the recognized entity 
can enjoy personality”4. In other words, recognition is a political act constitutive of statehood. 
On the other hand, the declaratory theory postulates that a political community becomes a state 
if it meets certain criteria of effectiveness. The Montevideo convention stipulates that a state 
becomes a person of international law by possessing a permanent population, a defined 
                                                             
1 Oppenheim, 2008: 146. 
2 Michael Schoiswohl, 2004: 6. 
3 Hersch Lauterpacht, 1944. Page not retrieved due to the closing of the library during the coronavirus pandemic. 
4 Jure Vidmar, 2012: 37. 
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territory, a government, and the capacity to enter relations with the other states5. When those 
criteria are met, the act of recognition is only a political act from recognizing states to 
acknowledge the established situation. Statehood is therefore created on legal grounds 
regardless of recognition. And if the entity proves its effectiveness and is not recognized by 
other states, it still possesses rights and duties in its international relations with other states. 
Nonetheless, as Kelsen says, the problem of recognition “has neither in theory nor in practice 
been solved satisfactorily”6. Indeed, if contemporary scholars contend that international 
recognition is now analysed from a declaratory angle, practices of states show that ineffective 
entities are still recognized as states whereas effective entities are not recognized and evolve in 
diplomatic limbo by not enjoying international rights. Furthermore, practices leave no doubt 
that recognition is of crucial importance as it determines the legal capacity of an actor to enjoy 
international rights and duties in its relations with other states. Indeed, as Fabry states, 
recognition is essential for “the political, security, legal, economic, and sociocultural 
development of states”7. Indeed, whether recognition creates statehood or not, it is nevertheless 
considered as an essential element to acquire a status both in international relations and 
international law. And the quest for recognition remains a major factor of political conflicts, 
especially when an entity wishes to secede from its parent state and achieve independence. 
This gap between theory and practice is highlighted by the cases of South Sudan and 
Somaliland. Indeed, by declaring its independence from Sudan in 2011, South Sudan is the 
newest member to enter the international community of states8. And although doubts were 
raised whether South Sudan met the legal criteria of statehood, its secession from Sudan was 
unanimously recognized by the international community. On the other hand, Somaliland, a 
stable and democratic de facto state with an effective control over its territory since it 
unilaterally declared its independence from Somalia in 1991, may better qualify for statehood 
than South Sudan9. Nevertheless, if recognition has been the ultimate objective for Somaliland 
since 1991, it is still not recognized by any members of the international community. 
Therefore, this thesis aims to contribute to the existing literature on state’s recognition by 
proceeding to a comparative analysis of South Sudan and Somaliland. The thesis does presume 
to speculate on general findings about the practices of recognition. Rather, the focus will be put 
                                                             
5 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, 26 December 1933. 
6 Hans Kelsen, 1941: 605 
7 Mikulas Fabry, 2010: 2 
8 Redie Bereketab, 2012: 4 
9 Redie Bereketab, 2012: 4 
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on the secessionist movements of South Sudan and Somaliland in order to explain how their 
comparison can help to understand the various dynamics leading to the decision to recognize 
one state but not another. The intention is to study the relationship between law and politics in 
the process of recognition. Therefore, this paper will put the emphasis on two different 
phenomena believed to have had an influence in the decision-making processes that led to the 
international recognition of South Sudan but not Somaliland. The first phenomenon under study 
is the role of international law, and especially of legal norms, defined by Krasner as “standards 
of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations”10. This paper will then put the focus on 
regulative norms of international law11, understood as constraining states’ behaviour with 
regard to recognition of new states. The second phenomenon is the influence of international 
politics in the granting of recognition to an aspiring state. More specifically, I intend to analyse 
the influence of external and powerful actors in the recognition of states. With this in mind, this 
thesis will attempt to respond to the following research question: 
Why was the independence of South Sudan unanimously recognized while Somaliland remains 
unrecognized by the international community? 
In order to answer this overarching question, the following sub-questions will be addressed: 
- What is the role of international legal norms in the process of international recognition? 
 
- What political influence does the external actors have in the achievement of 
international recognition? 
 
1.2 Research Design 
 
1.2.1 Comparative Analysis 
The method used in this thesis will be the comparative case study method. Indeed, the choice 
of the qualitative method of comparison is driven by its relevance for explaining differences 
between cases by following a common framework of analysis12. As Bennett and Elman say, the 
comparative analysis has come to play an increasing role in the domain of international relations 
                                                             
10 Stephen, Krasner, 1982: 186. 
11 Finnemorre, Martha and Sikkink, Kathryn, 1998: 891. 
12 Chris Pickvance, 2005: 2. 
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due to its suitability for studying “complex and relatively unstructured and infrequent 
phenomena”13. The case study method appears then appropriate to study the causal processes 
that led to different outcomes between similar phenomena. More specifically, the case study 
method used in this paper will be the most-similar case comparison. This method is derived 
from the logic of Mill’s method of difference, consisting in choosing cases that “are as similar 
as possible in all but one independent variable and that differ in their outcomes”14. By doing 
so, it becomes possible to attest that the different outcomes between the cases originate from 
the difference in the independent variable. With regards to the gathering of sources, the option 
chosen is the qualitative method of document analysis. Indeed, this technique allows to interpret 
a wide range of documents in order to find patterns and answer my research questions.  
 
1.2.2 Case Studies 
The choice of the two case studies are justified by their similarities in many aspects. Both South 
Sudan and Somaliland are situated in the same sub-region of the horn of Africa. Therefore, the 
two movements were subjected to the same regional dynamics and mechanisms arising from 
common neighbouring countries. Furthermore, both struggles for secession and claims for 
recognition were initiated after of the process of decolonisation, whose era was particular with 
regard to international responses to recognition of statehood. Also, in both cases, the population 
seeking secession suffered violence and human rights abuses from their parent states. And both 
case studies are identified with a specific population and territory within the parent state. Thus, 
South Sudan and Somaliland both used similar strategies to legitimize secession, by referring 
to the same legal norms of international law, among which the right of self-determination and 
remedial secession. Finally, another common feature lies in the referendums implemented 
demonstrating a strong popular support for secession from the parent state. 
The different outcome between South Sudan and Somaliland is the success of the secessionist 
movements considered as the achievement of statehood through the recognition of the entity as 
a sovereign state by the international community. To explain this different outcome, the 
difference between the two cases is the influence of external actors, more specifically the great 
powers, in the legitimization of the secession and its international recognition.  
                                                             
13 Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, 2007: 171. 
14 Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, 2007 175. 
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The next chapter of the thesis will consist to present the legal and political implications of the 
process of recognition. It will attempt to provide a comprehensive understanding of the 
dynamics surrounding the issue of state’s recognition. Therefore, after presenting the dynamics 
surrounding the debate between the constitutive and declaratory theories, I will explain why 
this debate does not provide a satisfactory framework to properly understand the practice of 
recognition. Thus, the focus will be put on the influence of the principle of self-determination 
as a legal norm for recognition. Finally, the influence of international politics in state’s 
recognition will be described. The second chapter will consist of the comparative analysis of 
South Sudan and Somaliland. Therefore, by analysing the similarities and differences between 
the two cases, this thesis will attempt to provide an answer to the research questions. 
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2 State Recognition 
 
2.1 International Law: The great debate 
Among scholars of international law, the debate about the creation of statehood has been 
historically dominated by two competing theories: the declaratory and the constitutive theories. 
The debate is still a source of academic research, as the theories defend conflicting 
interpretations about the legal function of state’s recognition. 
The constitutive theory makes recognition by other states as a prerequisite for the creation of 
statehood. As Oppenheim says, “a state is, and becomes, and International Person through 
recognition only and exclusively”15. Indeed, as the international community is constituted of 
states, they are directly concerned and should have a key role in the admission of new 
members16.  Discretion of states is seen as indispensable to maintain international stability. 
Therefore, recognition is not automatic but a voluntary and political choice.  The constitutive 
view was popular during the nineteenth century. As Nicholson and Grant show, if international 
law is considered as “a system of rules applying between states”, the states must be able to 
shape it17. Constitutive theorists do not argue that legal criteria should be ignored, but that 
without recognition, a state does not exist in the legal sense, having no rights among the 
international community.  
Criticism of the constitutive theory have argued that it is subjective and can freely ignore facts 
on the ground. But the main criticism points to the unlimited discretion of recognizing states. 
As Worster argues, a constitutive recognition makes the state subject to recognizing states’ 
choices18. Thus, states could abuse their position by using recognition as a tool to follow self-
interested considerations19. It is thus argued that the constitutive model opens the door to 
realpolitik by introducing international politics into international law20. Furthermore, the 
constitutive theory is considered as eroding equal sovereignty between states. If states are equal, 
how the creation of a state can be unilaterally decided by others? Another problem comes from 
the incoherencies created by the discretion of states. Indeed, by making statehood dependent 
                                                             
15 Thomas Grant, 1999: 2. 
16 Oppenheim, 2008: 128. 
17 Thomas Grant and Rowan Nicholson, 2020: 28. 
18 William Thomas Worster, 2009: 148. 
19 Jure Vidmar, 2012, 377. 
20 William Thomas Worster, 2009: 148. 
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upon recognition, what happens when a new state is recognized by a state but not by another? 
This situation leads to what Lauterpacht calls a “mascarade”21. Then comes the question: how 
many states are necessary for an entity to be universally accepted as a state? For instance, 
Kosovo received a significant amount of recognitions but remained unrecognized by many 
other states. Thus, is Kosovo a state or not? The question of where to put the threshold of the 
number of recognitions necessary for achieving statehood is currently without answer.  
In response to the constitutive theory, the declaratory theory postulates that a state comes into 
being by meeting legal criteria of effectiveness. Those legal criteria are often referred to as the 
criteria outlined in the Montevideo Convention22. Signed in 1933, the Montevideo Convention 
refers to the attributes of statehood as being: A permanent population23, a defined territory24, a 
government25, and the capacity to enter relations with the other states26. In the declaratory 
model, recognition by other states is not a condition of statehood but a mere acknowledgement 
of the existing situation. It is a purely political act with no effect on statehood27. Thus, the state 
can exist and have rights without being recognized. And if an entity meeting the requirements 
of statehood is not recognized, it has still the right to be treated as such by the international 
community28. And as statehood is independent of recognition, discretion of states is limited. 
And contrary to the constitutive theory, the argument is that international stability is maintained 
when states are bound together by common rules of behaviour. 
As for the constitutive theory, the declaratory model has raised many criticisms. A first criticism 
refers to the fourth criteria of the convention, the “capacity to enter relations with other states”. 
Sterio considers that it implies recognition as an element of statehood. As she argues, “an entity 
claiming to be a state cannot conduct international relations with other states, unless those other 
states are willing to enter into such relations with that entity”29. As Crawford says, this criterion 
is more a consequence of statehood achieved through recognition30. Furthermore, if recognition 
                                                             
21  Hersch Lauterpacht, 1944. Page not retrieved due to the closing of the library during the coronavirus pandemic.  
22 The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, December 26, 1933. Article 1. 
23 Peter Radan refers to the community around which the new state organizes itself. No rule about the size of the population is 
specified (Peter Radan, 2020: 49). 
24 Peter Radan refers to the exclusive and effective control of the territory, with no regards to its size or contiguity (Peter Radan, 
2020: 49). 
25 James Crawford defines it as the “the actual exercise of authority, and the right or title to exercise that authority” (James 
Crawford, 2007: 57), while Radan refers to the “existence of effective government” exercising authority over its territory and 
its people (Peter Radan, 2020: 49). 
26 James Crawford refers to the ability of the territorial entity’s government to act on his own behalf in its relations with the 
international community (James Crawford, 2007: 62). 
27 Milena Sterio, 2013: 48. 
28 Jure Vidmar, 2012: 362. 
29 Milena Sterio, 2013: 48. 
30 James Crawford, 2007: 61. 
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is now believed to be declaratory, constitutists argue that it is not followed by the practices of 
states. Thus, practices leave no doubt that without recognition, the so-called states do not enjoy 
legal rights within the international society. Moreover, some states do not or have never met 
the criteria of the Convention, and still they are fully recognized as states. Thus, a large 
proportion of African ex-colonial states are what Robert Jackson calls “quasi-states”31. Their 
statehood is considered incomplete as they display a considerable lack of basic features of 
states. Somalia for example, does not have a functional government and no effective control 
over its territory since the 1990s32. And yet, no states ceased to recognize it. Furthermore, some 
entities fully meet the requirements without being a state or even claiming to be one, as with 
Taiwan which claims to represent the Republic of China33.  
Furthermore, criteria are considered incomplete and only based on principles of effectiveness. 
As Grant says, the convention summarizes statehood only as “the ability of a government to 
exercise control over a definite territory and people”34. How the government came to power 
and how it governs is no relevant as long as effectiveness is demonstrated. Therefore, it is 
argued that additional criteria are necessary. Among them is the willingness to comply with 
international law. Crawford claims that if an entity seems unable or reluctant to conform with 
peremptory norms of international law, “it is not entitled to be regarded or recognized as a 
sovereign and independent power”35. In 1969, the Vienna Convention of the law of treaties 
defined a peremptory norm as “a norm accepted and recognized by the international community 
of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted”36. Those norms aim to 
protect the international order by codifying the use of force and the protection of human rights37. 
Therefore, Radan and Grant put forward the protection of human rights, especially minority 
rights, as a precondition for statehood38. Indeed, protection of minorities has evolved as a rising 
concern for international law. During the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1991, the EC made the 
recognition of Croatia and Slovenia dependent upon the commitment to additional requirements 
among which was the obligation to protect the democratic rights of ethnic minorities39. 
Similarly, Crawford and Grant consider that democracy is well positioned for becoming a new 
                                                             
31 Robert Jackson, 1993 : 21. 
32 Thomas Grant and Rowan Nicholson, 2020: 27. 
33 Thomas Grant, 1999: 439. In: Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Consent and its Discontents. 
34 Thomas Grant, 1999: 105. 
35 James Crawford, 2007: 91. 
36 James Crawford, 2007: 100. 
37 James Crawford, 2007: 101. 
38 Peter Radan, 2020: 52. Thomas Grant, 1999: 97. 
39 Peter Radan, 2020: 52. Thomas Grant,1999: 98. 
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criterion40. In the context of the achievement of statehood, Crawford sees the “consent of the 
governed” as a precondition for recognition41. Thus, the use of violence or disregard for 
elections should be sufficient to deny recognition42. Finally, self-determination as the right of a 
‘people’ to freely determine their political status is proposed by some as a new criterion for 
statehood. Indeed, self-determination offers the right to statehood to a people under alien 
subjugation. Crawford believes that people entitled with this right and seeking independence 
should be recognized43. Nevertheless, the addition of criteria is not necessarily reflected by the 
practices of recognition. As Grant argues, they are based on politically-inspired norms of 
international law. Additional criteria are thus not universally accepted as legitimate because 
they can be manipulated to legitimize political outcomes44.  
In an attempt to reconcile the two theories, some scholars have proposed hybrid approaches to 
recognition. Indeed, neither the declaratory and constitutive doctrines are satisfactory to address 
the process of recognition. As Kelsen explains, the reason is that recognition is “a subject of 
enormous complexity, principally because it is an amalgam of political and legal elements in a 
degree which is unusual even for international law”45. Lauterpacht proposed a theory of 
collective recognition46. Admitting that recognition is “constitutive, as between the recognizing 
state and the new community, of international rights and duties associated with full 
statehood”47,  he asserts that an international organ should be tasked with granting it48. And in 
the absence of such an organ, Lauterpacht argues that existing states have a duty to recognize 
entities when they meet the legal criteria of statehood49. But as Kelsen says, “existing states are 
only empowered, they are not obliged, to perform the act of recognition”50. In the same vein as 
Lauterpacht, Dugard considers that admission to the UN should imply a duty to recognize51. 
However, as Radan shows, it is not sufficient as practices show that members states are not 
obliged to recognize other members52. For instance, Israel is a member of the UN even though 
it is not recognized by some other members53. Finally, Schoiswohl considers that recognition 
                                                             
40 Thomas Grant, 1999: 94. 
41 James Crawford, 2007: 150. 
42 Thomas Grant, 1999: 94. 
43 Thomas Grant, 1999: 87. 
44 William Thomas Worster, 2009: 159. 
45 Joseph Kuntz, 1950: 713. 
46 Hersch Lauterpacht, 1944. Page not retrieved due to the closing of the library during the coronavirus pandemic. 
47 Hersch Lauterpacht, 1944. Page not retrieved due to the closing of the library during the coronavirus pandemic. 
48 Thomas Grant, 1999: 126. 
49 Jens Bartelson, 2013: 315. 
50 Hans Kelsen, 1941: 610. 
51 William Thomas Worster, 2009: 121. 
52 Peter Radan, 2020: 54. 
53 Peter Radan, 2020: 54. 
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should be both declaratory and constitutive. As he argues, in cases where there are no doubts 
about the fulfilment of the criteria by an entity, and when its new status is not disputed, 
recognition has no legal effect and should be declaratory54. However, when it is disputed 
whether the entity have met the requirements of statehood, recognition is essential and then 
constitutive of the entity’s new status55. 
 
2.2 The principle of Self-determination 
The principle of self-determination is of special importance as it has a long history in state’s 
creation. Generally speaking, self-determination refers to the concept according to which a 
socially cohesive group of people is recognized as having a legitimate right to freely determine 
its political status, whether it be through political autonomy, association, or statehood56. As 
Fabry shows, self-determination started to play a role in state’s creation during the 19th century 
as a negative right for ethnic people to determine their political destiny provided that facts 
evidence that they can do it57. Recognition was granted only to assumed ‘civilized’ entities that 
could effectively control their territory58. It is in the aftermath of the Second World War that 
the concept found its way towards a legal and positive right under international law. The 
prerequisite of effectiveness was abandoned when the UN charter stated that its purpose was 
“to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples”. The idea was to encourage member states to allow minority 
groups to more self-governance59. As Crawford shows, more than a rule of international law, 
self-determination was understood as a “principle of justice and of liberty”60, and therefore led 
to varied interpretations in its application. Thus, self-determination was strongly connected to 
the process of decolonization as it became the spearhead of colonized people in their struggle 
with colonial powers to achieve statehood. This connection was made clear in 1960, when the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, stated that 
the people entitled with the right of self-determination were the “specific peoples of colonial 
non-self-governing and trust territories”61. It was therefore embedded in international law as a 
                                                             
54 Michael Schoiswohl, 2004: 42. 
55 Michael Schoiswohl, 2004: 43. 
56 Michael Schoiswohl, 2004: 60. 
57 Mikulas Fabry, 2020: 39. 
58 Mikulas Fabry, 2020: 41. 
59 Milena Sterio, 2013: 11. 
60 James Crawford, 2007: 111. 
61 Mikulas Fabry, 2020: 41. 
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legal norm for all people under colonial rule to achieve statehood and been recognized as such 
by the international community. As Jackson says, most of African countries achieved statehood 
not through criteria of effectiveness but only through the obtainment of a “title to exercise 
authority over a certain territory”62.  
But a problem emerged when the principle continued to be called upon after the decolonization 
context by movements wishing to secede from their parent state. Indeed, secessionist claims for 
the right of self-determination started to pose a serious challenge to the territorial integrity of 
states63. Especially to newly African independent states that achieved statehood through the 
decolonial process, as they display a high level of ethnic heterogeneity within borders inherited 
from the colonial era. If it was clear during the colonial context that the bearer of the right were 
the multi-ethnic people “as a whole” living under colonial rule, no definition of the people was 
provided after the decolonization64. In other words, if the ‘people’ first corresponded to the 
territory of the colony, with no regards to the diverse ethnic groups living in it65, the question 
raised to whether distinctive features like religion, language, cultural heritage, or racial 
background were sufficient to qualify a people as entitled to the right of self-determination once 
colonies achieved their independence66. The issue relied in the subjectivity going along with 
the self-perception of a group as a ‘distinct people’ that should form its own political 
community67. 
In 1970, the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation among States, reaffirmed that the right of self-determination was referring to 
the people living under European colonial rule. The right to independence was limited to the 
decolonization process and newly established states should enjoy a right to territorial integrity 
as long as they represent the entire people “belonging to the territory without distinction as to 
race, creed or colour”68. Outside the colonial context, claims of self-determination by ethnic 
groups were then subordinated to the territorial integrity of states and understood as a right to 
more participation within the inalienable borders of their state. Henceforth, as Laoutides shows, 
the principle of Uti Possidetis was introduced to confirm “the borders of colonies as the borders 
of the new independent states”69.  Thus, as Kohen explains, the stability of African borders 
                                                             
62 Gerard Kreijen, 2004: 148. 
63 Marcelo Kohen, 2006: 102. 
64 Milena Sterio, 2013: 11. 
65 Milena Sterio, 2013: 11. 
66 Stephen Oeter, 2015: 131. 
67 Stephen Oeter, 2015: 131 and Milena Sterio, 2013: 16. 
68 Milena Sterio, 2013: 12. 
69 Costas Laoutides, 2020: 64. 
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since the decolonization is due to the introduction of the principle by the OAU in the Cairo 
Resolution in 1964 as a new criterion to the interpretation of self-determination70. Establishing 
the definitive delimitation of African borders fixed by colonial powers, no challenges by ethnic 
groups to the existing borders were allowed without the consent of the parent state. Uti 
possidetis became thus the main means to prevent secessionist movements from being 
recognized. For instance, Biafra’s secession from Nigeria in 1967 was not recognized because 
the OAU was supportive of the territorial integrity of its parent state71. 
Therefore, two conceptions of the right to self-determination emerged, an internal and an 
external one. If the external right of self-determination, understood as the achievement of 
statehood, was assumed to have been already achieved during the decolonization process. The 
internal aspect aimed to find a balance between respect for territorial integrity and protection 
of human rights. As Gadkowski defines it, it refers to “the right of peoples organised as states 
to freely decide on the political, social and economic system that their state should adopt”72. 
Thus, outside the colonial context, the right of external self-determination fell by the wayside 
as it coincides with the concept of unilateral secession, defined by Kohen as “the separation of 
part of the territory of a state which takes place in the absence of the prior consent of the 
previous sovereign”. An issue about which international law prefers to be neutral, as it is of 
direct relevance with the sovereignty of states73. Indeed, as Moore outlines, the right of self-
determination had a potential “destabilizing effect for the international system”74 if considered 
as a universal right to independence for all ethnic groups. As the Vienna Declaration stated in 
1993, the right of self-determination “shall not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any 
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political 
unity of sovereign and independent states conducting themselves in compliance with the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and thus possessed of a government 
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind”75. The 
idea was that states enjoy their territorial integrity if they behave in accordance with the internal 
right of self-determination.  
But what happens when a state does not act in compliance with an equal representation of its 
people? International law remains unclear on the issue. Indeed, by not addressing the issue of 
                                                             
70 Marcelo Kohen, 2006: 27. 
71 James Crawford, 2007: 406. 
72 Tadeusz Gadkowski, 2017: 27. 
73 Marcelo Kohen, 2006: 27. 
74 Margaret Moore, 2003: 4. 
75 James Crawford, 2007: 118. 
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secession outside the colonial context, Sterio argues that international law became “outdated”76. 
Today, if secession is authorized when the parent state consents to it, international law remains 
relatively silent on the question of unilateral secession, neither formerly prohibiting or allowing 
it, except in two ways. When an entity is still considered as a colony and wish to break away 
from its metropolitan state, and when a territory is considered as being under occupation77. 
Nevertheless, if it wants to be coherent with its emphasis on the protection of human rights, 
international law should give more importance to the question of the morality of secession.  
Therefore, contemporary scholars came to consider that the denial of rights entails a right to 
external self-determination, and then a moral right to secession for non-colonial people. Among 
them, Buchanan developed what is called the ‘remedial right’ to secession. Derived from John 
Locke’s theory on the right to revolution, whereby “the people have the right to overthrow the 
government if and only if their fundamental rights are violated, and more peaceful means have 
been to no avail”78, Buchanan states that a group’s right to secede is morally justified “if and 
only if it has suffered certain injustices, for which secession is the appropriate remedy of last 
resort”79. As a just-cause theory of secession, the ‘remedial secession’ states that a group needs 
a “just cause” to have the right to secede80. Buchanan refers to a group whose physical survival 
is “threatened by actions of the state”81. The denial of the internal self-determination is not 
sufficient for a ‘remedial’ secession as the group must be victim of extreme violence. Another 
condition for the right to ‘remedial secession’ refers to the injustice created when a territory has 
been illegally taken away and incorporated into another state82. Only under those conditions the 
remedial right to secede can be applied. 
This section outlined the incoherencies surrounding the principle of self-determination as a 
legal right to achieve statehood. It shows that the belief whereby statehood must be subjected 
to effectiveness was not supported by the practices during the colonial context. Most colonial 
states are then considered as ‘juridical’, as they lack the basic features of states as prescribed 
by international law. As Bull and Watson argue, they are recognized as states in the legal sense 
because the international community decided to “only by courtesy”83. Nevertheless, as the 
principle continues to fuel claims to statehood, the challenge of self-determination, a legal right 
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enshrined in international law, is that respect for self-determination of peoples and territorial 
integrity of states must be balanced in a sensitive manner. 
 
2.3 The influence of International Politics  
In an attempt to explain the gap between theory and practice, other scholars came to consider 
that recognition is motivated by international politics. Taking for granted that recognition has 
a constitutive effect in the sense that it is external legitimacy that determines if statehood can 
be exercised within the international community, those scholars outlines the influence of 
external actors in the process of recognition. Indeed, as Coggins says, states are not equal and 
the most powerful ones, the so-called ‘great powers’, play a “especially important role in the 
selection of new members”84. As Sterio says, great powers are super-states, because they are 
the most “militarily, economically, and politically potent players” of the international system85. 
According to Levy, a great power has “unusual capabilities with which to pursue its interests 
in interstates relation; uses those capabilities to pursue unusually broad and expansive foreign 
policies beyond its immediate neighbourhood or region; and seeks to influence the course of 
international affairs”86. However, identifying great power’s status remains subjective, 
depending on which capabilities qualifies a state as such. If members of the UN security 
council, with their veto power, are often referred to as great powers, as they possess a 
tremendous political influence over international issues, others would refer to economic powers 
and include the members of the G887.  
Therefore, because states are not equal in their influential capabilities, international issues like 
recognition of states will reflect this inequality. Thus, because they have a greater relational 
power, great powers’ decisions are the most important ones on the question of recognition as 
they can influence other states’ decision-making processes88. Therefore, when a secessionist 
movement advance the interests of the most powerful states, it will be more likely recognized 
as a state. Sterio considers thus the support of the great powers as a new criterion in the 
interpretation of the right of self-determination. Indeed, she argues that if a secessionist people 
seeking self-determination must first show that is has suffered massive abuses from the parent 
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state, it must also obtain the great powers’ support in order to legitimize its secession89. This 
additional criterion is what Sterio calls the “great powers rule”90. Indeed, as many smaller states 
depend on the great powers for economics and political issues, they often follow their foreign 
policies. Therefore, as Coggins calls it, recognition by great powers often leads to a “cascade” 
of recognitions by other states91.  
Nevertheless, great powers have no advantage in having unlimited discretion to decide which 
state to recognize. And great powers are incentivized to coordinate their actions to maintain 
international order92. Indeed, international stability is threatened when great powers disagree 
with each other. By collectively aligning their own preferences, great powers avoid conflict 
between them and maintain the international order. Thus, great powers may choose not to 
support an entity aspiring to external self-determination if it will be perceived as a provocation 
by another powerful state. Furthermore, a collective recognition from the great powers ensure 
more legitimacy for the aspiring state. Thus, as Coggins says, some aspiring states were 
universally recognized despite dubiously meeting the legal criteria of statehood because self-
interested considerations from the great powers aligned positively with each other93. However, 
when the great powers’ interests do not converge, international stability is at risk and the 
situation will remain in status quo. The secessionist movement remains unnoticed by the 
international community by not receiving substantial media attention. Therefore, as Sterio says, 
the support of the great powers “has determined the outcome of almost every self-determination 
struggle over the last few decades”94. And as Coggins outlines, as international politics are 
dynamic, great powers’ interests can evolve over time, and with them the chances of a 
secessionist movement to achieve statehood95. 
But great powers’ alignment of preferences is not sufficient to legitimize recognition of a new 
state. As Fabry shows, even great powers have to justify their recognition choices through legal 
norms96. Otherwise, recognition in violation of a norm will put the system’s stability at risk. 
Indeed, great powers prefer to evolve in a stable international system based on shared rules and 
norms, as it restrains their respective powers in their relations with each other97. However, in 
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the absence of a universally shared organ to interpret norms with regard to recognition, the risk 
is that great powers may arbitrary invoke them to follow their own political agenda98. This 
situation led Krasner to consider the regime of recognition as an “organized hypocrisy”99. As 
he says, if states were not pursuing self-interested politics with regard to recognition, there 
would be no tension between the declaratory and constitutive theories, and all entities with an 
effective control over its population and territory will be recognized as having rights within the 
international system100. In his understanding of the process of recognition, Krasner refers to 
two different logics of state’s behaviour: the logic of consequences and the logic of 
appropriateness. Developed by March and Olsen, the logic of consequences postulates that the 
state is a rational actor whose actions are driven by a calculation of the expected outcomes in 
order to maximize its interests101. On the other hand, the logic of appropriateness emphasizes 
the role of rules and identities in shaping state’s behaviour in a given situation102.  State’s action 
is then more driven by rules than interests103. Nevertheless, the two logics are not mutually 
exclusive, and neither one of the two logics can solely explain state’s behaviour. Indeed, as 
March and Olsen states outlines, states “are constituted both by their interests, by which they 
evaluate their expected consequences, and by the rules embedded in their identities and political 
institution”104. And the relationship between the two logics varies according to the given 
situation. Therefore, in a situation where expected outcomes are clear, and the rules are 
ambiguous and contradictory, a logic of consequences will be more important. On the contrary, 
if rules are clear but the outcomes unsure, the logic of appropriateness will dominate105. 
But the problem with regard to recognition is that the international system is constituted of 
contradictory rules and norms. Indeed, protection of human rights goes against the principle of 
non-intervention106. And in the context of recognition, the right of self-determination is opposed 
to the territorial integrity of states107. Therefore, according to Krasner, the logic that prevails is 
often the logic of consequences108. And as states are unequal, the most powerful ones can easily 
“pick and choose between the different rules” to justify their choices and follow their self-
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interested preferences with regard to recognition109. And if norms and rules matter, they are 
part of a rational calculation from the great powers with regard to the expected outcomes offered 
by an aspiring state. 
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3 Comparison of South Sudan and Somaliland 
 
3.1 South Sudan 
 
3.1.1 Historical Background 
The south Sudanese struggle for emancipation has a long history that goes beyond the post-
colonial era. Indeed, before its independence on 1 January 1956, Sudan was already subject to 
a divide between its northern and southern parts110. In fact, the concept of Sudan as a united 
country is a colonial creation from Britain and Egypt that administered it from 1899 to 1956111. 
Colonial authorities drew Sudan’s borders with little regard to the ethnicity, language, and 
culture of the inhabitants. Therefore, colonial Sudan encompassed two different peoples, 
Muslim Arabs in the North and Christian Black Africans in the South. This North-South divide 
was exacerbated by Britain’s rule that administrated the two regions differently. Indeed, 
different policies with regard to administration, education and language were established, and 
the South was marginalized as most of the investments went to the northern region112. And prior 
to independence, political and economic domination of the north was already taking shape and 
protests emerged in the southern part113.  At its independence, Sudan was thus already divided 
between an Arab North and a Black South.  
In the early years of the Sudanese state, the situation worsened for the south. In 1958, General 
Ibrahim Abboud took power and replaced the civil government by military rule114. The 
government of Khartoum implemented a policy of ‘Arabization and Islamization’ of the 
country115. Arabic became the official language, conversion to Islam was encouraged, and the 
government financed the building of mosques and Islamic schools all over the country116. 
Southern contestations were answered militarily. In this context started the first civil war in 
1962 when the southern people resolved to armed struggle by forming the SSLM and its 
military branch, Anya-Nya117. Southern people were then divided between those wanting a 
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federal solution and those having separatist aspirations. The civil war finally ended in 1972 
with the Addis-Ababa agreement118. If the question of independence was left out, the agreement 
granted the Southern region with internal self-determination. The distinctiveness of southern 
people was recognized when the 1973 constitution declared Sudan a secular state and 
established regional self-governance for the non-Islamic South119. The South enjoyed an 
autonomous government with its own elected assembly, and English was recognized as its main 
language120. Nevertheless, as De Vries and Schomerus say, it was only a “weak semi-
autonomy”121 as Khartoum kept significant control on the south. The agreement further 
weakened when oil was discovered in the South in the 1970s122. Indeed, South’s self-
governance ended in 1983 when president Nimeiri abrogated the Addis-Ababa agreement123. 
Nimeiri intended to exploit south’s natural resources. He therefore dissolved the Southern 
Regional Government and divided the south in three regions to reduce its influence124. 
Moreover, Nimeiri revised Sudan’s laws by imposing the Islamic law throughout the country, 
including the Christian South. This denial of southern people’s rights and imposition of Sharia 
law led to the second civil war. In addition to the SSLM was then formed in 1983 the SPLM 
and its military branch the SPLA, under the leadership of John Garang125. Contrary to the SSLM 
that wanted to secede from South Sudan, SPLM/A’s primary objective was to implement equal 
human rights for all religious and ethnic communities within a democratic, secular, and united 
Sudan126.  
Nevertheless, the civil war received only little attention from the international community, at 
least until 1989, when General Omar al-Bashir took power through a military coup127. Al-Bashir 
established an authoritarian regime, banned all political parties, and pursed a policy of massive 
suppression of Southern contestations. Under his regime, Sudan became a fundamentalist 
Islamist state, and looked for Muslim countries’ support in its war with the South. In 1991, 
Iran’s president Rafsanjani declared the war a “jihad” against the south and provided Khartoum 
with financial and military aid128. Moreover, Bashir’s regime aligned its policy with radical 
Islamist groups. Sudan opened its doors to terrorist organizations like Al-Qaida, providing them 
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with training bases. In this context, Ben Laden was hosted from 1992 to 1996129. With this 
Islamist agenda, more and more southern rebels were considering South Sudan’s independence 
as the only solution to end the long-lasting conflict with the North130. Furthermore, a Christian 
South struggling for its independence from an oppressive Muslim North attracted the attention 
of the international community. Bashir’s regime suffered growing pressure to respect South 
Sudanese people’s rights131. In this context was signed in 2005 the CPA between the Sudanese 
government and the SPLM/A to end the war132. The CPA recognized the right to self-
determination for the South and the future holding of a referendum to determine South Sudan’s 
status133. The internationally monitored referendum took place on 9 January 2011, in which 
South Sudanese had two choices: unity with the North or independence. 98,8% of the 
population voted for independence134. On 9 July 2011, South Sudan declared its independence 
from Sudan and received unanimous recognition from the international community, becoming 
Africa’s fifty-fourth state135. 
 
3.1.2 The Legal Case for Recognition 
The legality of South Sudan’s secession has been justified on the grounds of the right of self-
determination. Indeed, in order to avoid the fragmentation of state’ borders, international law 
recognizes the right of internal self-determination to people. There is no right to secede if the 
parent state behaves in compliance with this right. Therefore, South Sudan’s secessionist claims 
have been legitimized by the fact that Sudan did not respect the right to internal self-
determination of South Sudanese people. As of the independence of Sudan, southern demands 
for a federalist solution were declined by northern leaders136. As Horowitz shows, after the 
independence, “inhabitants of South Sudan who comprised 25% of the total population of 
Sudan were allocated 800 posts in administration, 3 out of 43 seats in Constitutional assembly, 
3% of army officers and 4% of police officers”137. Moreover, during the civil wars, a large 
proportion of southern rebels were fighting for regional autonomy within Sudan and not with 
the primary objective of creating a new state. But there is no doubt that Sudan, by the revocation 
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of the Addis-Ababa agreement and the attempts at imposing Islamic laws to the South, did not 
have the intention to grant autonomy to the South. Therefore, South Sudan’s right to external 
self-determination is justified by the constant denial of the South Sudanese people’s rights and 
its political misrepresentation within Sudan. Furthermore, South Sudan’s external self-
determination has also been justified through the theory of remedial secession138. Indeed, the 
civil wars have been marked by large-scale violence from the parent state. A report of the 
International Crisis Group estimates that 2 million people died “as a result of the fighting over 
the past eighteen years, victims of direct violence or related starvation and disease”139. As South 
Sudan’s first president Salva Kiir said in 2011:” We have been bombed, maimed, enslaved and 
treated worse than refugees in our own country”140. And in 2009, Bashir was indicted by the 
international Criminal Court for crimes against humanity141. If it is debatable whether 
international law does recognize a remedial right to secession, the South Sudanese external self-
determination has been defended as the only option to put an end to the long-lasting violence 
from the North. 
However, the legality of South Sudan’s application of the right to self-determination is 
debatable as it took place outside the decolonization context. Indeed, international law limited 
claims to secession to the colonial context in order to protect the territorial integrity of states. It 
only allows it when an entity is under alien occupation or considered as a colony that did not 
achieved its independence during the decolonization process. In order to respect the principle 
of Uti Possidetis, South Sudan’s self-determination has thus come to be considered as a case of 
‘delayed decolonization’. Indeed, the SPLM claimed that South Sudan was a different entity 
than Sudan as it was administrated separately by the British142. It is thus argued that South 
Sudan was unlawfully incorporated into the post-colonial Sudan and should have been entitled 
to achieve independence during the decolonization process143. Under this perspective, South 
Sudan’s secession is legal under international law as a case of denied decolonization.  
Nevertheless, legality of South Sudan’s right to self-determination raised many questions. One 
of them referred to the South Sudanese people’s entitlement to this right. As there is no proper 
definition of the ‘people’ under international law, does South Sudan really constitutes a people? 
One could say that South Sudan’s population is ethnically diverse. Its population includes more 
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than 60 different cultural and linguistic tribes144. In that sense, as Sterio says, it is difficult to 
consider that South Sudan constitute a “single people”145. Nevertheless, it can also be argued 
that South Sudan constitutes a people in the sense that its population is radically different from 
that of the North. Indeed, Northern Sudanese are Arabs and Muslims while Southern Sudanese 
are mostly Black and Christians. Therefore, the recognition of the South Sudanese as a people 
can be built on its ethno-religious difference with the northern population. It can also be argued 
that South Sudan’s sense of identity was reinforced by the sentiment of oppression arising from 
decades of northern domination146.  
Furthermore, is South Sudan’s self-determination really a case of ‘delayed’ decolonization? 
Indeed, is it debatable whether South Sudan can justify its secession as not being in conflict 
with international law that proscribes secession outside the colonial context. Indeed, as 
Bereketeab outlines, “South Sudan was not a colonial creation in the usual sense”147. Even 
though the British administrated it differently from the North, it was done within the colonial 
state of Sudan, and South Sudan was never a separate territory from the North148. It can thus be 
argued that South Sudan’s secession happened outside the decolonization process. And under 
this perspective, the legality of South Sudan’s external self-determination is opened to debate.  
Furthermore, it is also arguable whether South Sudan meets the legal criteria of the Montevideo 
Convention and was therefore entitled to recognition. As Riegl argues, if the SPLM/A “virtually 
controlled most of the territories” claimed prior to independence, it did not manage to 
implement functioning institutions to establish an effective state149. Today, South Sudan’s 
territorial control is still not fully achieved, and tensions remain with Sudan over the disputed 
territories of Abyei, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan150. No agreements have been found about 
the status of those regions claimed by both countries. But doubts with regard to South Sudan’s 
effectiveness are mostly supported by the observation of the domestic challenges facing the 
new state since its independence. The South Sudanese government did not manage to ensure an 
effective control over its population neither. Indeed, shortly after the independence, rebellions 
started to oppose the central state dominated by the SPLM/A151. As aforementioned, South 
Sudan is characterized by a significant ethno-cultural heterogeneity. If the different groups were 
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united in their opposition against Sudan, the newly independent South Sudan reignited tensions 
between the communities. Ethnic communities have their own armed groups, and tribal clashes 
became endemic in the new state. As Mario shows, out of the 10 provinces composing South 
Sudan, 9 are currently the theatre of inter-ethnic conflicts152. Furthermore, Salva Kiir’s 
government, dominated by the Dinka community, is accused of trying to hold power 
indefinitely153. And his government is characterized by corruption and patronage according to 
ethnic considerations154. In that context, clashes broke out between the Dinka and Nuer 
communities in 2013 and plunged the country in chaos155. These clashes have resulted in the 
displacement of thousands of people and led to a serious humanitarian crisis156. In February 
2017, famine was officially declared by the UN157. And in the same year, Freedom House 
classified South Sudan as ‘not free’, with the least score in political rights and civil liberties158. 
Thus, recognition of South Sudan has been considered by some as premature as it is evolving 
towards a failed state. Indeed, years after independence, South Sudan’s government still 
significantly lacks the infrastructure and institutions to provide basic services to its population 
and establish effective governance over its territory159.  
 
3.1.3 The Role of External Actors 
If South Sudan has been so quickly and unanimously recognized as a state despite a 
questionable meeting of the criteria of statehood, it is because the international community has 
supported the SPLM/A in its struggle with Sudan. Indeed, the support of external actors, 
especially the great powers, is a determinant factor to South Sudan’s independence. In fact, the 
great powers’ role was also previously crucial in the lack of support to South Sudan’s struggle 
from the international community before the 1990s. Indeed, during the cold war, Sudan was 
supported by the USSR and China160. And Sudan was at the same time the largest African 
recipient of American aid, as the USA were attempting to contain the communist influence in 
the region161. Therefore, South Sudan’s struggle received only little attention from the 
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international community and Khartoum was able to crush southern rebellions with impunity 
and continue with its policy of imposing the Islamic law to the South162. The international 
community and the OAU were supportive of the territorial integrity of Sudan.  The situation 
changed with the military coup of Bashir in 1983, after which Sudan’s policy evolved towards 
a radical Islam and started to favour extremist Islamist groups. In the shifting of the international 
perception of Sudan, the role of the US is of special importance. Indeed, fearful that Sudan 
becomes a safe haven for international terrorism, the US foreign policy towards Sudan radically 
shift from support to defiance. Therefore, Washington suspended its assistance to Sudan and 
imposed economic sanctions to the country. In 1993, Sudan was placed on the American list of 
states sponsoring terrorism, and in 1996, the US closed its embassy in Khartoum163.  
Anti-SPLM/A in the 1980s, Washington started to demonstrate a strong support to the secession 
of South Sudan. Cooperation between the US and the SPLM/A were expanding as the 
US/Sudan relationship was deteriorating. In the 1990s, the US became the principal donor of 
humanitarian aid to South Sudan164. At the same time, the Clinton administration was also 
supporting regional countries in order to contain Sudan. Neighbouring countries like Ethiopia, 
Eritrea, and Uganda received substantial financial and military aid from the US as a way to 
isolate Bashir’s regime165. After the cataclysm of the 9/11 attacks, the situation worsened for 
Khartoum. The international community was fearful of countries sponsoring terrorism and 
pressures over Sudan intensified. Bashir’s regime was progressively isolated by the expansion 
of international sanctions. The atrocities committed by its regime were denounced and received 
a large media coverage. The US led a strong global campaign in support of South Sudan166. 
And celebrities like Georges Clooney or Don Cheadle, supportive of South Sudan’s 
independence, participated in the worldwide spread of the South Sudanese cause167. Khartoum 
received growing pressure from western powers to negotiate with South Sudan. In 2002, the 
US threatened Sudan with additional economic sanctions if the government was not prone to 
negotiate with Southern rebels to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict168. Eventually, 
weakened by international pressures and sanctions, Bashir’s regime negotiated with the 
SPLM/A and signed the CPA in 2005 with the promise of holding a referendum to determine 
South Sudan’s future status. Regional powers played a decisive role in the process. Kenya, 
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considered as neutral by both Sudan and South Sudan, participated in the peace process by 
hosting the negotiations169. In cooperation with the African Union, Ethiopia, which has 
supported the SPLM/A since the 1980s, facilitated the negotiations over the delimitation of the 
borders between the Northern and Southern parts of Sudan170. During the interim period, the 
US reinforced their assistance to South Sudan. In addition to humanitarian aid, the focus was 
put on improving the SPLM’s capacity to governance171. The US also assisted South Sudan in 
transforming the SPLA in a more professional army172. Furthermore, Washington made clear 
that Sudan would be removed from the list of countries sponsoring terrorism on the condition 
that Khartoum does not jeopardize the referendum and recognize the new state of South 
Sudan173. When the South Sudanese people voted for independence, Bashir recognized 
immediately the new state. Following this, Obama declared: “The eyes of the world are on the 
Republic of South Sudan. And we know that Southern Sudanese have claimed their sovereignty 
and shown that neither their dignity nor their dream of self-determination can be denied.”174 
Therefore, there is no doubt that the US played a decisive role in enabling South Sudan to 
achieve independence. Indeed, South Sudan has benefited from the evolution of the US 
geopolitical interests with regard to Sudan. If the US had first interests in supporting the 
territorial integrity of Sudan during the Cold war, its consideration of South Sudan changed 
when Khartoum’s foreign policy did not fit in with that of the US. An independent South Sudan 
presented the advantage of weakening a Sudan hostile to Washington. The US involvement has 
then been crucial for the international support to the secession of South Sudan. And South 
Sudan managed to make its case internationally and enjoyed a large-scale media attention from 
the international community that was detrimental to the legitimization of South Sudan’s 
recognition as a state. Furthermore, the political and economic pressures on Khartoum forced 
the parent state to negotiate and accept the secession of South Sudan. The role of external actors 
has been detrimental to the implementation of the CPA and the holding of a referendum which 
made South Sudan’s secession legal under international law. Therefore, even though South 
Sudan was able to justify its secession with the principle of self-determination, it is the support 
of external actors, and especially the US, that helped in the application of international law and 
determined the status of South Sudan as a state recognized by the international community. 
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Without the support of external powerful actors, it can be argued that South Sudan would not 
have been able to achieve its right to external self-determination. As Sterio says, the case of 
South Sudan is then a “coincidence between international law and the great powers’ rule”175. 
 
 
3.2 Somaliland 
 
3.2.1 Historical Background 
Unlike South Sudan, Somaliland was a separate entity during colonial times. Known as British 
Somaliland, the territory was administered by Britain from 1884 to 1960. With the 
decolonization of Africa, Britain granted independence to Somaliland in its existing borders on 
26 June 1960. Somaliland was recognized as a state by 35 nations, including all members of 
the UN security council176. But the independent state of Somaliland did not last long, as five 
days later, on 1 July 1960 Somaliland decided to merge with the former Italian Somalia to create 
the Republic of Somalia. The idea of unification was based on a shared Somali culture177. 
Indeed, Italian and British Somalilanders are the same people, speaking the same language and 
sharing the same religion178. And the merger was driven by the dream of a “Greater Somalia” 
to include all Somali communities of the region179. 
Nevertheless, the unification was not easy. The two territories drafted two different treaties of 
union. Somaliland’s treaty, the Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law, was ignored by the 
legislature of Somalia that approved another treaty, the Atto di Unione, on 1 July 1960. This 
treaty was never signed by Somaliland that favoured a federal solution instead of a unitary 
state180. Therefore, the two countries merged into the new republic of Somalia without a valid 
act of unification. In the absence of such an act, in 1961 was held a referendum to approve the 
Somali Republic’s constitution and endorse the unification. Somalilanders massively boycotted 
the referendum, and of only 100 000 votes cast, 53% voted ‘no’ to the constitution181. A 
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sentiment of disillusion rose in Somaliland, as it was becoming clear that Italian Somalia will 
dominate the new country. The head of state and major governmental positions were 
overwhelmingly allocated to Southern Somalians. British Somalilanders only hold 33 seats out 
of the 123 composing the National Assembly182. The allocation of the prime ministership to 
Mohamed Egal, a British Somalilander, nurtured the illusion of equity and power-sharing 
between the two regions183. In that context, an attempted coup by Somalilanders officers to 
restore Somaliland’s independence failed in 1961184. In the early years of Somalia, the illusion 
of democracy rapidly deteriorated as the country was being undermined by clan politics and 
corruption. These clan-based conflicts led to the assassination of president Shirmake in 1969185. 
In the following days, democracy in Somalia came officially to an end when the army led a 
coup and put Mohamed Siyad Barre in the presidency. The SRC was established and the young 
country came under authoritarianism. Political power was centralized in the hands of southern 
clans linked to the president. The regime’s political repression towards other clans provoked 
widespread disaffection among the population. As Kaplan says, this period saw the emergence 
of “ten clan-based resistance movements” across the country186.  Indeed, the Somalian state 
transformed from a decentralized to a centralized and oppressive state focused on clan-based 
corruption and military force187. Socio-economic developments were concentrated in the South. 
And Northern demands for redistribution of resources were ignored by the central state. This 
economic marginalization and denial of political representation rapidly reignited the 
animosities with Northern Somalilanders and refuelled aspirations for separate statehood. In 
that context, the dominant clan in the North, the Isaaq, formed the SNM in 1981 in order to 
overthrown Barre’s oppressive regime and reconsider the union of the two territories188. 
Assisted by Ethiopia that had been in war against Barre’s regime over the Ogaden region in 
1977, the SNM established its base in the neighbouring country189. But when Ethiopia and 
Somalia signed a peace treaty in 1988, the SNM was forced to leave and the conflict with barre’s 
regime escalated in a full-scale civil war190. When the SNM captured the Northern cities of 
Hargeisa and Burao in 1988, Mogadishu responded with extreme violence by indiscriminately 
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bombing the northern cities. An estimated 50,000 people have died and half a million fled to 
Ethiopia191. 
Eventually, the civil war led to the overthrow of Siad Barre in 1991 and the collapse of the 
Somali state. In that context, the Isaaq-dominant SNM and other northern clans gathered on 18 
May 1991 at the Burao Conference in which they declared their right to self-determination and 
the unilateral independence of Somaliland192. The Republic of Somaliland was created, and 
SNM was granted a two-years mandate to govern the new country. In 1993, the Borama 
conference gathered the clan elders to discuss the constitutional structure of the new state. The 
council of elders agreed for an executive president and a bicameral parliament193. Mohamed 
Egal was elected president of the Republic of Somaliland. The constitution institutionalized a 
power-sharing structure between rival clans by establishing an Upper House of Elders194. Thus, 
while Somalia was becoming a failed state and its territory controlled by rival clan factions, 
Somaliland was building a stable governance based on democratic processes. In 2001, a 
referendum was held to vote on a new constitution and reaffirm the status of Somaliland as an 
independent state195. The referendum was internationally monitored and 97% of Somalilanders 
voted for independence196. Nevertheless, its secession has not been recognized by any members 
of the international community. If Somaliland’s leaders have justified their right to be 
recognized under international law, Somaliland is still considered as part of the state of Somalia 
and does not enjoy international rights.  
 
3.2.2 The Legal Case for Recognition 
Somaliland’s claim for recognition can be justified on many grounds. Indeed, Somaliland had 
a separate colonial existence from Italian Somalia. Therefore, as international law allows 
external self-determination for colonized entities, Somaliland’s declaration of independence is 
justified on the basis of its colonial existence. Therefore, Somaliland’s secession is not in 
conflict with the principle of Uti possidetis as it exists within the borders inherited from the 
British colonial administration. In addition to its separate colonial status, Somaliland’s claim 
for recognition is based on its brief existence as an independent state. Indeed, British 
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Somaliland has been granted independence on 26 June 1960 and recognized as a sovereign state 
by 35 nations. Somaliland claims that its separation from Somalia is not a case of secession but 
rather a restoration of its former sovereignty197. Therefore, Somaliland’s authorities affirm that 
the declaration of independence is in conformity with the Constitute Act of the African Union 
that stipulates the “respect of borders existing on the achievement of independence”198.  
Moreover, the treaty of unification drafted by Southern Somalia, the Atto di Unione, has never 
been ratified by Somaliland’s authorities. Hence, the creation of the Republic of Somaliland 
did not meet the legal requirements of international law. Indeed, the Vienna convention on the 
Law of Treaties stipulates that “a treaty enters into force as soon as consent to be bound by the 
treaty has been established for all the negotiating States”199. Therefore, the Act of Union is 
legally invalid under international law. Under a legal perspective, Somaliland’s union with the 
South remained then without force. Indeed, in 1963, the charges of treason against northern 
military officers who attempted the coup in 1961, were dismissed by a British judge on the 
grounds that the Act of Union was invalid and that the court lacked the jurisdiction to act upon 
events that happened in Somaliland200. Therefore, Somaliland’s government considers the 
Republic of Somalia as an “illusion of unity”201. Under this perspective, is it argued that 
Somaliland’s separation from Somalia does not constitute a dismemberment of a sovereign 
state202 as it does not violate the territorial integrity of a united Somalia that never legally 
existed. And the declaration of independence is not considered by Somalilanders as a unilateral 
secession, but as the result of a “unsuccessful union”, similar to the dissolution of Senegambia, 
which was accepted by the AU203. Therefore, under a legal perspective, Somaliland’s claim to 
statehood is justified on the basis of its separate colonial experience and the restoration of its 
status as a sovereign state illegally incorporated into an unsuccessful union. 
Somaliland’s justification for recognition is also based on the denial of their internal right to 
self-determination by Mogadishu. Indeed, contrary to South Sudan, Somaliland inhabitants are 
ethnically homogenous. If they are all Somali, most of Somalilanders belong to the Isaaq clan, 
while southern Somalia is predominantly composed of Hawiye204. They have their own identity 
and culture distinct from southern Somalis. Furthermore, Somalilanders’ own identity has been 
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built on their common colonial history and their sentiment of marginalization under Barre’s 
regime205. There is no doubt that Somalilanders have been unable to exercise their internal right 
to self-determination within the Republic of Somalia. With Siad Barre as president, Northern 
aspirations to regional autonomy were systemically dismissed, and Somalilanders were 
politically and economically marginalized. Somaliland’s declaration of its external self-
determination is thus justified under international law as a result of the violation of the internal 
right to self-determination to people by Barre’s regime206. Moreover, as South Sudan, 
Somaliland also justifies its external right to self-determination by the grave violations of 
human rights committed by the central state. Indeed, in its war with the SNM, the Isaaq 
population has been targeted by Barre’s regime. The government’s reaction to the SNM attacks 
of Hargeisa and Burao stood out by its brutality towards the population accused of supporting 
the SNM. It is estimated that the civil war killed between 50,000 and 100,000 Somalilanders207. 
Amnesty International reported that “the war was fought by the Somali armed forces without 
any respect for standards of international humanitarian law. No effort was made to distinguish 
between civilians and armed combatants. The shelling of Hargeisa was indiscriminate, and 
unarmed civilians were rounded up en masse and shot”208. Therefore, if we assume that 
violations of human rights imply a right to remedial secession, Somaliland’s independence can 
also be justified on this basis. As president Egal said: “we have a moral right to be recognized 
[…] and international lawyers tell us any nation which has been victimized by a state of which 
it was part has the right to secede”209. 
Furthermore, Somaliland has claimed that it has ‘earned’ its sovereignty by meeting the legal 
requirements of statehood provided by the Montevideo Convention. Indeed, Somaliland has a 
permanent population and a defined territory inherited from the British protectorate. Its territory 
was internationally fixed by the Anglo-French treaty in 1888, the Anglo-Italian treaty in 1894, 
and the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty in 1897210. Its defined territory is composed of a stable 
population estimated at 3,5 million people. And the 2001 referendum demonstrated the 
cohesion of the population in the support of an independent Somaliland211. Moreover, 
Somaliland has been able to develop a stable and effective government structure, with a clear 
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separation between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches212. Somaliland managed to 
bring peace and stability to the region by building an inclusive and democratic governance. The 
House of Elders was established to include and represent the different clan minorities. The 
stability of Somaliland’s governance is evidenced by the staging of peaceful democratic 
elections. Important enough in Africa to be stressed, Somaliland has demonstrated democratic 
transitions. In its first presidential election in 2003, only 72 votes decided the election of 
president Kahin, who was confirmed without contestation213. And in 2010, the second 
presidential elections saw the peaceful transfer of power from Kahin to Silanyo214. As Wallis 
outlines, by this time, only three African states had seen “incumbent presidents stand down 
after being defeated in elections”215. And today, Somaliland distinguishes itself by its stability 
and effective governance. And ironically, Somaliland’s meeting of the criteria of effectiveness 
is better than its parent-state that does not have a functioning administration and control over 
large parts of its territory since 1991216.  
Finally, Somaliland also developed its capacity to enter into relations with other states. 
Somaliland has managed to establish diplomatic relations with many states. Indeed, Somaliland 
has signed bilateral agreements of co-operation with the neighbouring countries of Ethiopia and 
Djibouti, the only states accepting Somaliland passports217. In fact, by demonstrating its 
effectiveness in governance, Somaliland managed to achieve de facto recognition from a 
number of states. De facto recognition refers to the political acceptance that an entity has 
effective authority over a territory. Therefore, it reckons the de facto state as an actor of 
international relations with which contacts can be established, without recognizing its statehood 
under international law218. It differs then from de jure recognition which refers to the legal and 
definitive recognition of statehood219. Somaliland has thus opened liaison offices in many 
states, among which the USA, UK, France, Belgium, South Africa, and South Sudan220. And 
the UN, the EU, and other international organizations have established offices in Somaliland to 
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operate humanitarian programs221. Furthermore, the US and European countries are operating 
with Somaliland authorities for security and counterterrorism operations in the region222. 
 
3.2.3 The Role of External Actors 
Somaliland fulfils both the requirements of the right of self-determination and the attributes of 
statehood. Furthermore, Somaliland’s claim to independence conforms with the AU policy with 
regard to the respect of colonial boundaries. Nevertheless, given Somaliland’s strong case for 
recognition, the international community has remained surprisingly silent on the case, and 
Somaliland remains unrecognized. The reason lies in the consideration of Somaliland as a case 
of unilateral secession that violates the territorial integrity of Somalia. Indeed, to maintain peace 
and stability on the continent, the AU emphasizes the ‘sacrosanctity’ of existing African borders 
and is hostile to situations that could lead to dismemberment of its member states223. It is thus 
feared that the international recognition of Somaliland would open a ‘Pandora’s box’ that will 
lead to the fragmentation of states and the destabilization of the region224. Indeed, given the 
ethnical heterogeneity of African states, the fragmentation of Somalia bears the risk of 
triggering a ‘balkanization’ of the region225. It could set a precedent and incite other secessionist 
movements to redraw the colonial borders. 
Consequently, the international community has widely been hostile to the recognition of 
Somaliland, as it condemns secession without the consent of the parent state. Indeed, 
Somaliland’s main obstacle to its recognition lies in the lack of consent from Somalia. 
Nevertheless, the Somaliland’s case draws the distinction between secession and dissolution. 
Indeed, secession from a state requires the consent of the parent-state to be legitimized under 
international law. In the case of the dissolution of the parent-state, there cannot be consent as 
the mother state ceased to exist226. As Crawford outlines, it can be sometimes difficult to 
distinguish a dissolution “initially triggered by the secession”, with a secession as a direct 
consequence of the dissolution227. For instance, the recognition of the ex-Yugoslav republics 
without the consent of Yugoslavia was justified on the basis that it dissolved and no longer 
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existed as a state228. In the case of Somaliland, the independence was declared following the 
collapse of the Republic in Somalia in 1991. Today, Somalia is a failed state, and there is no 
functioning authority to discuss with in order to reach an agreement on Somaliland’s status. It 
is thus argued by some that Somaliland’s independence is the result of the dissolution of its 
parent-state, and that Somaliland’s recognition conforms to international law229. 
Thus, in 2005, an AU fact-finding mission reported that Somaliland’s claim for recognition was 
“unique and self-justified in African political history” and that “the case should not be linked 
to the notion ‘of opening a Pandora’s box’”230. It was added that “the AU should be disposed 
to judge the case of Somaliland from an objective historical viewpoint and a moral angle vis-à-
vis the aspirations of the people”231. It seems then that the non-recognition of Somaliland is not 
based on legal considerations but on political considerations.  
Western countries tend to be reluctant to engage on the question of Somaliland’s recognition 
as they consider the issue as an “internal African affair”232. In fact, western powers are more 
engaged in the restoration of diplomatic relations with Somalia due to its strategic location on 
the coast of the Horn of Africa and its potential destabilizing effect for the region. In the early 
years of Somaliland’s existence, the Clinton administration prioritized the re-establishment of 
the Somalian state to tackle the spread of terrorism and Islamic radicalism233. And since the 
American intervention in 1992, the US foreign policy has focused on the restoration of order in 
Somalia through assistance in the state-building process234. Indeed, Somalia’s collapse is not 
seen as irreversible. In 2001, the TNG was formed to represent the Somalian state 
internationally and reclaim its seat at the AU among other international organizations235. 
Therefore, the focus of the international community has been put on the re-establishment of a 
functioning and stable authority in Somalia through the support to the TNG.  
Nevertheless, the US and UK have expressed readiness to recognize Somaliland. Britain 
proposed that the EU recognizes the referendum as bringing “further stability, prosperity and 
democracy to the people of Somaliland”236. The proposition was rejected by several Europeans 
countries, and especially Italy, arguing that it was implying a recognition of Somaliland which 
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was not in conformity with the international community’s position on the question. The US 
position is that the recognition of Somaliland should wait for the AU to recognize it first. As 
the US Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer said: “We do not want to get ahead of the 
continental organization on an issue of such importance”237. Consequently, Somaliland’s 
authorities did not manage to attract the support of western powers. This situation was 
summarized in 2001 by Mohamed Egal when he declared: “Originally, when I was elected in 
Borama, one of the main reasons I was so unanimously elected and the whole country approved 
of my election, was the fact there was a sense that this man is a friend of the western 
governments and he is much more likely than anyone else to get recognition from them. That 
was an idea that has proven to be false”238. Indeed, as Schraeder states, the position of western 
powers has endorsed the concept “African solutions for African problems”239. 
However, the AU is actually paralysed by different positions from its members with regards to 
the issue. Indeed, while countries like South Africa, Rwanda or Zambia support the recognition 
of Somaliland, Somaliland’s neighbours have geopolitical interests in non-recognizing its 
independence. While Egypt was supportive of South Sudan’s independence, it however still 
supports a reconciliation of Somaliland with Somalia. Indeed, Cairo believes that a united 
Somalia can be an ally in its conflict with Ethiopia over the Nile river basin240. Djibouti is also 
opposed to an independent Somaliland. Indeed, Somaliland is considered as a threat to the 
internal security of Djibouti. During the civil war, Djibouti did not support the SNM, as the 
Isaaq clan had relations with the Afar opposition in Djibouti241. Somaliland also accused 
Djibouti of trying to influence Elders to oppose the separation from Somalia242. Furthermore, 
the port of Berbera in Somaliland is seen as a threat to Djibouti’s own ports on which its 
economy is based243. Eritrea is another neighbour opposed to the recognition of Somaliland, as 
it favours a united Somalia as a counterweight to the Ethiopian influence. In its war with 
Ethiopia, Eritrea also tried to foster the opposition to the independence in Somaliland when 
Ethiopia used the port of Berbera244. Ethiopia’s position is more blurred. Although it benefits 
from the use of Somaliland’s port, an independent Somaliland also poses a threat to its own 
Somali irredentism in the Ogaden region245. In the same way, Ethiopia’s interests are not going 
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towards a united Somalia, that could wish again to reunite all Somali people into one country, 
as under Barre’s regime. Consequently, if Ethiopia has today extended political and economic 
relations with Somaliland, Addis-Ababa does not seem ready to be the first to recognize it as a 
state and take the risk to bring more division within the AU246. 
 
3.3 Why South Sudan and not Somaliland? 
 
The analysis of the case studies has shown that South Sudan’s legal case for recognition is 
weaker than that of Somaliland. And yet, South Sudan was unanimously recognized as a state 
while Somaliland has still not been recognized by a single member of the international 
community. This thesis postulates that the reason for this discrepancy lies in the political 
choices made by powerful actors of the international system with regards to their support for 
the two secessionists movements. 
Indeed, South Sudan’s secession from Sudan enjoyed the support of the great powers, and 
particularly the US. Therefore, the SPLM/A has been able to legitimize its cause in the eyes of 
the international community, and the Republic of Sudan has been forced to negotiate and 
recognize South Sudan’s decision to achieve its own statehood. On the other hand, Somaliland’s 
separation from Somalia, despite meeting the requirements of statehood and being in 
accordance with the right of self-determination, did not attract the support of external actors. In 
Krasner’s words, Somaliland is a “small and not very important place”247, which has found 
itself not significant enough for the geopolitical interests of the great powers. Moreover, the 
non-recognition of Somaliland was driven by the fear of further destabilizing a region already 
plunged in clan-based conflicts. Nevertheless, the situation could evolve for Somaliland. 
Indeed, it has been reported in 2018 that Russia expressed readiness to recognize Somaliland 
as an independent state while negotiating with its authorities for the establishment of a military 
naval base in Somaliland248. If it happens, Russia will have no difficulties to justify its decision 
under international law. In the same year, the UK also expressed its willingness to reinforce its 
political and economic relations with Somaliland and to establish a military naval base in 
Berbera249. This ‘bargaining’ situation reinforces this thesis’s assumption whereby the 
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achievement of international recognition is closely connected to the geopolitical interests of 
powerful external actors. Therefore, it provides an answer to our research question “What 
political influence does the external actors have in the achievement of international 
recognition?”, which is that powerful actors play a crucial role in the legitimization of a 
secessionist movement when it suits their geopolitical preferences. 
With regards to the role of legal norms, the comparison of South Sudan and Somaliland shows 
that they have been selectively applied to legitimize political choices from the recognizing 
states. South Sudan’s recognition was justified by the right to external self-determination and 
‘remedial secession’ on the basis of the political misrepresentation and suffering the South 
Sudanese people have experienced under Bashir’s regime. Those same norms did not apply to 
Somaliland that had a similar experience under Barre’s regime, because the idea of a united 
Somalia is still privileged by external actors. It is therefore argued in this thesis that the 
recognizing state have selected the legal norms that suited their objectives. 
Therefore, this thesis outlines the relationship between rationality and norms. Indeed, rational 
choices and norms tend to be considered as opposed concepts. Nevertheless, in the process of 
recognition of new states, rationality and norms are to be considered as interconnected. It 
opposes the strict opposition between the constructivist and rationalist theories of international 
relations. Indeed, constructivism postulates that state’s interests are ‘constructed’ through 
shared norms and ideas, which determine the appropriate state’s behaviour in a given 
situation250. Here, states’ behaviour is defined by norms. The rationalist theory, on the other 
hand, considers that international relations are made of rational states pursuing only their own 
interests251. Here, interests and norms are distinct concepts, and norms only exist to constrain 
states’ behaviour. But as Abbott outlines, rational choice and constructivism must be seen as 
complementary because states “sometimes respond to interest-based incentives and sometimes 
to norms or identities”252. Indeed, interests and norms must be considered here as the two sides 
of the same coin that determines states’ behaviour.  State’s behaviour is constituted both by 
rational choices and adherence to norms. They are both part of the calculation from rational 
states to determine their decisions. In Abbott’s words, interests and norms “belong in the 
analytical toolkit to be used when appropriate”253.  
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Thus, this thesis argues that in the case of South Sudan and Somaliland, the great powers’ 
behaviour with regards to norms has been determined by a logic of consequences. Indeed, the 
geopolitical consequences in recognizing South Sudan were clear for the great powers: 
weakening an Islamic Sudan hostile to the West and supportive of terrorist organizations. 
Therefore, the application of the right to self-determination to South Sudan is believed to have 
been driven by the expected outcomes it could provide. In the case of Somaliland, the respect 
to the territorial integrity of Somalia have predominated over the right to self-determination of 
Somalilanders because the neighbouring countries have geopolitical interests in the non-
recognition of Somalia as a sovereign state. Therefore, what is the role of international legal 
norms in the process of international recognition? The answer proposed in this thesis is that 
legal norms provide legal justifications for states to legitimize their political preferences in 
recognizing or not new states. 
The comparative analysis of South Sudan and Somaliland has then attempted to show that the 
practices of recognition can be closely connected to the geopolitical interests of powerful 
external actors. Indeed, international politics is essential to understand the incoherencies 
surrounding the recognition of South Sudan and the non-recognition of Somaliland. And as 
international law is composed of opposing norms and rules, recognizing states benefit from a 
variety of norms to legitimize their political decisions in supporting or not a secessionist 
movement according to their preferences.  
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4 Conclusion  
The comparison of South Sudan and Somaliland goes against the position of contemporary 
scholars according to which recognition is considered through a declaratory perspective. 
Indeed, under the declaratory theory, Somaliland should have been granted international 
recognition as it fulfils the legal requirements for statehood. On the contrary, South Sudan did 
not satisfy the criteria and a declaratory position from the international community would have 
prevented the secessionist movement from achieving statehood. Nevertheless, the discrepancy 
between the two secessionist movements with regards to the achievement of statehood cannot 
be neither explained through the constitutive theory only. Even though recognition has been 
constitutive as granting international rights to South Sudan and denying those of Somaliland, 
the recognizing states did not have unlimited discretion and had to justify their choices through 
legal norms of international law. Those legal norms have been the right to self-determination 
for South Sudan and the respect to the territorial integrity of Somalia for Somaliland. The 
different outcome between the two cases has therefore been the result of both political choices 
and legal arguments. 
Consequently, this thesis claims that the traditional debate between the constitutive and 
declaratory theories is not satisfactory to fully understand states’ practices with regard to 
recognition of new states. Indeed, recognition of new states cannot be understood as either a 
matter of law or politics. And limiting the debate to the two theories does not allow to grasp the 
crucial influence of international politics in the process of recognition. As the thesis has 
attempted to underline, recognition must be understood through a complex interplay between 
law and politics. Indeed, international recognition is a process that encompasses both political 
and legal considerations from external actors. Therefore, it can be argued that state’s creation 
encompasses two acts of recognition: The acknowledgement of the validity of the aspiring 
entity’s claims to recognition under international law, and whether or not other states recognize 
it as a new member of the international community with international rights. 
Finally, this thesis encourages to conduct further research on the meaning of statehood and its 
relationship with recognition. Indeed, there are different conceptions of statehood. The legal 
conception refers to the normative nature of the state, and as Kelsen defines it, the state is a 
“coercive, relatively centralized legal order”254. The state is a legal entity, understood as a 
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bundle of rights, whose creation is codified by law255. On the other hand is the non-legal notion 
of a state, referring to the concept of nation. As Worster sees it, it refers to “a community, 
sharing a common culture and a clearly demarcated territory, having a common past and a 
common project for the future, and claiming the right to rule itself”256. Therefore, as there is no 
consensus on the nature of the state, because it encompasses both legal and non-legal aspects, 
the present situation whereby statehood is understood as the entitlement to international rights 
and determined by political choices from recognizing states becomes problematic. As practices 
of recognition can lead to ineffective recognized states like South Sudan and effective 
unrecognized states like Somaliland, it is argued that recognition should be theoretically distinct 
from statehood. In that manner, in order to avoid further incoherencies with regards to the 
recognition of statehood, this thesis endorses Hersch Lauterpacht’s statement for the need of an 
international organ tasked with assessing claims to statehood and granting recognition to 
aspiring states. 
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